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In their attempted deconstruction of species concepts
and of our recent reviews of the vertebrate literature
on mitochondrial (mt) DNA variation, Hendry et al.
(2000) champion two major theses. First, they contend
that “mtDNA discontinuities do not closely match
recognized taxonomic species” and, hence, that these
molecular data help negate the notion that “species”
(genetic discontinuities) exist in the natural world.
Second, Hendry and coauthors advocate “abandon-
ing the concept of species” (biological, phylogenetic,
or otherwise), and adopting instead a new descript-
ive scheme that would group organisms at any level
strictly by “specifying the amount of difference in
various traits.”
Both of these conclusions are couched in the
authors’ premise that adherence to traditional species’
paradigms has blinded most biologists (ourselves
included) to Hendry et al.’s (2000) view: that the
species level of biological organization is no less arbit-
rary in concept or in practice than that for genus, order,
or any other taxonomic level in a hierarchical classific-
ation. This is an old and recurring issue (Darwin 1859;
Dobzhansky 1937; Mayr 1963). Without wishing to
appear unduly stodgy in defense of more traditional
species views (we too have serious reservations about
conventional paradigms for biological classification;
Avise and Johns 1999), we nonetheless take a rather
different slant on these two main points.
First, with regard to the level of agreement between
vertebrate taxonomic species and mtDNA phylogen-
etic discontinuities, the opposing judgments by us and
by Hendry and colleagues merely reflect, we think,
the difference between “viewing the taxonomic cup
as mostly full versus partly empty”. From our cited
reviews of the available mtDNA literature on verteb-
rates, the uncontested facts are as follows: (a) at least
75% of suspected sister species (named taxa thought
to be one another’s closest living relatives) display
pronounced mtDNA differences (this is why blatant
exceptions such as the cichlid fishes in Lake Victoria
attract such interest); (b) in nearly 50% of the taxo-
nomic species surveyed, geographic populations have
shown no major discontinuities in mtDNA phylogeny
(Hendry et al. (2000) are mistaken when they write
that these species were disregarded in the Avise and
Walker (1999) review – to the contrary, they constitute
the “one phylogroup per species” category in Figure 2
and in all data summaries); (c) in the remaining taxo-
nomic species displaying salient mtDNA discontinu-
ities, the number of “intraspecific phylogroups” thus
far detected is small, typically only two to six; and
(d) these pronounced phylogroups nearly always are
allopatric [an important point almost totally neglected
by Hendry et al. (2000)].
After taking into account several opposing biases
(several of which Hendry and co-authors reiterate) in
the existing data sets, we interpreted these collect-
ive observations as indicative of a surprisingly good
level of agreement (“certainly within an order-of-
magnitude”) between the number of recognized taxo-
nomic species of vertebrates and the number of sali-
ent discontinuities in mtDNA phylogeny (Avise and
Walker 1999). This sentiment would hold true even
if all of the known “intraspecific phylogroups” were
to be elevated to “full-species” status. As emphas-
ized repeatedly in our writings (e.g., Avise 1989,
2000), this is not to say that all current species-level
taxonomic assignments are “correct” by molecular
standards. But the current molecular data do suggest
that when all the results are in, the final tally of sali-
ent genetic discontinuities in nature probably will not
depart greatly from the number of taxonomic species
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currently recognized by vertebrate systematists. This
conclusion clearly carries importance for biodiversity
analyses and conservation efforts (Reaka-Kudla et al.
1997).
From years of hands-on experience, we never
cease to be impressed that even closely related verteb-
rate taxonomic species usually “stand out from one
another like sore thumbs” in molecular genetic assays,
whereas individuals within each phylogroup or species
normally show remarkably tight connections (recent
coalescence) in matrilineal history. Among other rami-
fications, such genetic findings have made it routinely
possible for molecular ecologists to employ mtDNA
and other molecular markers in detailed genetic
analyses of hybrid zones (e.g. Avise and Saunders
1984; Lamb and Avise 1986; Hewitt 1988; Scrib-
ner and Avise 1994; Avise et al. 1997) and to assist
in diagnosing otherwise cryptic sibling species (e.g.
Avise and Zink 1988; Knowlton 1993) (reviews in
Avise 1994).
As elaborated extensively by Avise (2000), these
matrilineal unities within and discontinuities between
biological entities probably register historical demo-
graphic factors primarily. For example, unexpec-
tedly small evolutionary effective population sizes for
many taxonomic species and intraspecific phylogroups
(Avise et al. 1988) appear to have tightened gene-
alogical connections within such units by foster-
ing relatively recent coalescent events, whereas
frequent lineage and population extinctions often may
have sharpened the boundaries between them. In
our view, such insights about the historical, non-
equilibrium dynamics of population demography, and
their ineluctable consequences in promoting unities
and discontinuities in micro-genealogy, have been
among the most important of the broader empirical
and conceptual contributions of the field of molecular
phylogeography (Avise 2000).
Our literature reviews were designed expressly to
address the topics of “species” and “speciation” in
sexually reproducing organisms from an unorthodox
vantage point – provided by an asexually transmit-
ted molecule. By virtue of predominant maternal
inheritance, mtDNA haplotypes are connected to one
another primarily via vertical pathways through exten-
ded organismal pedigrees, rather than “horizontal” ties
per se of interbreeding between males and females.
This is precisely why it is especially intriguing, in our
view, to find a reasonably good agreement between the
number of current taxonomic species (most of which
were identified in the philosophical era of biological
species concepts) and the number of phylogenetic
clusters registered as distinctive branches in mtDNA
gene trees. We interpret such agreement as evidence
for our contention that biological species concepts and
properly formulated versions of a phylogenetic species
concept often will tend to converge, in principle and
practice, on a recognition of the more salient of recent
biological discontinuities in the natural world (Avise
and Ball 1990; Avise and Wollenberg 1997).
We are acutely aware of many cases (sometimes
involving taxa of special conservation interest; e.g.
Laerm et al. 1982; Avise 1989; Avise and Hamrick
1996) where, in their species’ descriptions, taxonom-
ists seem to have “gotten it wrong” by the standards of
molecular evidence. Indeed, if this were not the case,
there would be little incentive for molecular reevalu-
ations. Hendry et al. (2000) are not incorrect to focus
on such disagreements between mtDNA boundaries
and taxonomic species; such emphasis is a matter
of taste. Nonetheless, we remain impressed by how
often traditional vertebrate systematists would appear
to have gotten things principally right.
Hendry et al. (2000) correctly emphasize that
there is considerable overlap in the frequency distribu-
tions of mtDNA genetic distance between intraspecific
phylogroups and sister species. Because of the many
known geographic, temporal, and demographic vari-
ables associated with different biological speciations,
and because of the great heterogeneity in taxonomic
standards applied by different organismal specialists,
we would be astounded if this were not the case.
Furthermore, biological speciation in most cases is a
temporally extended phenomenon rather than a point
event in time. From mtDNA evidence, we estim-
ated that vertebrate speciations require on average two
million years or more to go to completion, although
there is a huge variance about this mean (Avise et
al. 1998; Avise and Walker 1998). This implies that
historical separations of genealogical lineages ances-
tral to many of today’s sister species and other congen-
ers probably were initiated prior to the Pleistocene
(Klicka and Zink 1997).
If biological speciation in vertebrates normally
occurs over such an extended timeframe, then many
gray areas must exist along the temporal continuum
of black (conspecific status) to white (species status).
Almost inevitably, these will generate taxonomic diffi-
culties in any dichotomous scheme (such as that
employing Latin binomials) that can only recognize
populations as conspecific or not. But in our opin-
ion, this is insufficient rationale to abandon all current
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species concepts, for at least two reasons. First,
even a strictly gradual and cumulative process of
genetic divergence in the stream of heredity can and
apparently does eventuate over evolutionary time in
biological discontinuities (phylogroups and species)
in nature, much as discrete drops of water from a
leaky faucet can emerge from a continuous trickle
within. Second, to cleanse from evolutionary thought
all reference to species-formational processes (the
emergence of reproductive isolation, and/or of phylo-
genetic separations) would be to leave a hopelessly
sterile epistemological foundation for interpreting the
origin and maintenance of biotic discontinuities in
nature (Avise 2000).
This leads us to comment briefly on Hendry et al.’s
(2000) second major thesis – that after firmly abandon-
ing all species’ concepts, a new scheme for biological
organization should be adopted that recognizes taxa
at any level strictly on some quantitative basis of
how much they differ from one another in genetics,
morphology, or other features. We are highly sympath-
etic to the general idea that far greater standardization
is needed in taxonomic assignments, such that the
field of systematics someday may move to a truly
universal classification scheme that would convey far
more useful comparative information than the non-
standardized classifications currently in place (Avise
and Johns 1999). In our view, this standardized system
ideally would apply uniform or normalized ranking
criteria to all organismal groups above the level of
species such that, for example, a taxonomic genus,
family, or tribe of whales would be equivalent in a
scientifically informative sense to its taxonomic coun-
terpart in birds, fruit flies, or any other organismal
clade.
Indeed, we recently advanced and detailed an
explicit proposal for one such standardized scheme,
involving the concept of “temporal banding” (Avise
and Johns 1999). For taxonomic ranks above the level
of species, our basic idea is that absolute evolutionary
times (e.g., geological ages) of phylogenetic separa-
tion (rather than any second-order correlates such as
magnitudes of genetic or morphological divergence as
in Hendry’s et al. view) should in principle be the
ultimate common denominator for universally rank-
ing all forms of life. However, we do not recom-
mend extending any such arbitrary criteria to the level
of species, whose recognition in our view should
continue to make reference to formational processes
that have sundered groups of organisms that formerly
interbred.
Nonetheless, for the sake of argument, let us
consider what the proposal by Hendry and colleagues
might entail for current taxonomic practice at the
species level. Suppose, for example, that an arbitrary
level of genetic divergence for species-level recogni-
tion were set at a magnitude that would enable con-
tinued (traditional) recognition of the numerous cich-
lid species in Lake Victoria. These sympatric fishes
(recently diverged and reproductively isolated primar-
ily by prezygotic barriers) are extremely close genetic-
ally (Meyer et al. 1990), far less so than local “conspe-
cific” populations in many other vertebrate species
[see, for example, pp. 321–323 in Avise (2000)].
Thus, by this standard criterion of genetic divergence,
most currently recognized vertebrate species would
then demand taxonomic subdivision into dozens if
not hundreds of new “species”. What useful purpose
would this serve?
To counteract this problem, some higher genetic
threshold for species recognition might be advoc-
ated that would alleviate this absurdity of excess-
ive splitting. But any such arbitrary standard then
by definition would exclude from formal recognition
the Lake Victoria cichlids, for example. This too
would be undesirable in our view because that arti-
ficial taxonomy would give no hint that something
biologically interesting has occurred in the history of
these fishes (or in any other organismal group where
reproductive isolation was associated with less genetic
divergence than the threshold arbitrarily adopted).
Thus, old-fashioned though it may seem, we favor
the retention of more traditional species concepts that
retain a reference to biological processes. Although
sometimes difficult to implement cleanly in terms
of dichotomous nomenclature, these process-oriented
species concepts nonetheless serve biology well by
reflecting and also stimulating illuminating research
into organismal ecology, behavior, conservation, and
evolution.
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